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1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy 
Law & The New Institutional Economics 
Introduction 
John N. Drobak∗ 
The Articles in this symposium are examples of legal scholarship 
in the new institutional economics (“NIE”). The new institutional 
economics takes its name from institutions: the rules that structure the 
economic, political, and social interactions in a society. Institutions 
can be formal, such as law, or informal, such as social norms. The 
new institutionalists believe that economic performance cannot be 
understood without paying attention to institutions. Consequently, 
their scholarship examines a multitude of economic and political 
issues by focusing on institutions. Law in its various forms 
(constitutions, statutes, common law, contract terms, etc.) is the most 
important and prevalent type of formal institution, so the focus on 
institutions is often a focus on the law. To many new institutionalists 
legal issues are at the core of their scholarship, as this symposium 
will illustrate. 
This symposium examines law in a wide variety of topics, ranging 
from economic theory, to the application of the techniques of NIE to 
discrete issues, and to broad questions of economic growth. The 
authors, all highly respected scholars, include a Nobel Laureate in 
Economics,1 five former presidents of the International Society for 
                                                     
 ∗ George A. Madill Professor of Law, Professor of Economics, and Professor of 
Political Economy, Washington University. I would like to thank Doug North, Rolf Richter, 
Claude Ménard, Lee Benham, and Gerrit De Geest for their advice and suggestions about this 
Introduction. Any errors are mine, of course; not theirs. 
 1. Douglass C. North. 
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New Institutional Economics,2 one of the pioneers of the new 
institutional economics in Europe,3 a Commissioner of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission,4 and numerous legal scholars and 
economics professors. Before introducing the symposium Articles, 
the Introduction will begin by explaining the new institutional 
economics and its relationship with law and economics. 
NIE has existed as a specialty within economics for over a quarter 
century.5 Its prominence rose with the award of the Nobel Prize in 
Economics to two of the earliest scholars in the field, Ronald Coase 
in 1991 and Douglass C. North in 1993, and with the creation of the 
International Society for New Institutional Economics in 1997. 
Neoclassical price theory, the heart of contemporary economics, is an 
elegant, powerful model. Its quantitative aspects enabled 
mathematical economists to give the model ever expanding abstract 
applications over the past few decades. This quantification of the 
model often made the model less representative of the real economic 
world, however. Neoclassical price theory disregards the frictions 
inherent in making an economy work. The model does this in a 
number of ways. For example, it assumes away “transaction costs,” 
which are the costs of measuring the multiple dimensions of the 
goods and legal rights being exchanged in an economic transaction 
and the costs of enforcing these rights.6 The model also assumes 
away the political aspects of the economic world, even though 
                                                     
 2. Lee Alston, Benito Arruñada, Gary Libecap, Claude Ménard, and Douglass C. North. 
 3. Rudolf Richter. 
 4. Troy Paredes. 
 5. Oliver Williamson introduced the term “new institutional economics” in his 1975 
book Markets and Hierarchy: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, at 1, 7. However, the term 
lay dormant until Rudolf Richter began to draw together economists working in related areas 
under the banner of the new institutional economics. In 1978, Richter became the editor of a 
venerable German journal on general economics and changed its focus to the new institutional 
economics. Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional Economics: Its Start, its Meaning, its 
Prospects, 6 EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 164–65 (2005). In addition, Richter and his 
colleague Eric Furubotn began to organize annual conferences on NIE topics beginning in 1983 
and to publish the conference papers in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
which was the new English name of Richter’s journal. Independent of Richter’s efforts, others 
were also organizing conferences on the new institutional economics. As Richter says, “The 
term NIE seems to have soon been sufficiently salient to become a ‘self propelling’ 
expression.” Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional Economics—Its Start, Its Meaning, Its 
Prospects (Nov. 24, 2003) (copy on file with author). 
 6. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 27 (1990). 
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economic actors often try to use government for their own 
betterment.7  
The unrealistic assumptions underlying neoclassical price theory 
led to the mismatch between the model and reality. As Richard 
Posner has explained: 
In order to facilitate mathematical formulation and exposition, 
neoclassical price theory routinely adopts what appears to be, 
and often are, from both a physical and psychological 
standpoint, highly unrealistic assumptions: that individuals and 
firms are rational maximizers, that information is costless, that 
demand curves facing firms are infinitely elastic, that inputs 
and outputs are infinitely divisible, that cost and revenue 
schedules are mathematically regular, and so forth.8 
Concerned about the mismatch between the model and reality, some 
economists tried to modify the model to make it more useful for 
understanding the real world. It was from this reaction against 
“blackboard” economics that the new institutional economics was 
born.9 
It is important to emphasize that the new institutionalists do not 
reject neoclassical price theory. They recognize that the model 
successfully explains and predicts many real world markets and 
transactions.10 This acceptance of neoclassical price theory 
distinguishes the new institutionalists from the original institutional 
economists, whose ranks included Thorstein Veblen, John R. 
                                                     
 7. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, 
VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED 
HISTORY (forthcoming in 2008). 
 8. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 428 (1995). 
 9. Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INT’L & THEORETICAL 
ECON., 229, 229 (1984). 
 10. Sometimes the constraints of the real world make the assumptions of neoclassical 
price theory a close enough approximation of what really happens. To take one example, 
business firms do not try to maximize economic profit. In fact, most firms do not even try to 
maximize accounting profit. At the top end, firms try to maximize market share. That is an 
easier variable to observe, and it shows how a firm is doing relative to its competitors. At the 
bottom end, firms try to avoid insolvency. Both those objectives constrain firms to act very 
much as they would if they were attempting to maximize economic profit. In his essay for this 
symposium, “The Role of Law in the New Institutional Economics,” Rudolf Richter quotes 
Milton Friedman for the proposition that we should not ask whether assumptions are 
“descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good 
approximations for the purpose at hand.” Id. (quoting Milton Friedman, The Methodology of 
Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 15 (1953)). 
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Commons, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Willard Hurst.11 The original 
institutionalists did not just disregard economic theory, they 
affirmatively rejected it. As Ronald Coase puts it with his 
characteristic wit, the original institutionalists were “anti-theoretical, 
particularly where classical economic theory was concerned. Without 
a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive 
material waiting for a theory, or a fire.”12 In order to distance 
themselves from the original institutionalists, the current scholars 
embrace the adjective “new” in the description of their field. 
Not only do the new institutionalists recognize that the 
neoclassical model suffices for many purposes, they retain the model 
as part of their search for a better understanding of the problems for 
which the unaltered model is insufficient. They do this by relaxing 
the assumptions of neoclassical price theory and by augmenting the 
model in many different ways. Some try to identify the transaction 
costs and incorporate them into their theories.13 Others focus on 
property rights or contract theory. Some are concerned with the 
political aspects of economic decisions and so work in the fields of 
political economy and public choice. A group of new institutionalists 
modifies one of the central assumption of neoclassical price theory, 
the rationality of human action, by using cognitive science, 
behavioral psychology, and experimental economics. Much 
scholarship in NIE uses case studies or cross-country comparisons, 
probably an influence of the economic historians who were some of 
the earliest NIE scholars. Likewise, the focus on economic growth by 
economic historians has remained a central question for many new 
institutionalists.14 Within all these different research programs, there 
are many scholars who focus on the various forms of the law. 
                                                     
 11. POSNER, supra note 8, at 427. 
 12. Coase, supra note 9, at 230. 
 13. Transaction cost economics has its roots in the work of Ronald Coase, primarily from 
his two famous articles, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and The Nature 
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Oliver Williamson was a pioneer in using transaction 
costs to explain contractual relations in a variety of circumstances, including business 
transactions and anticompetitive issues. 
 14. For more comprehensive descriptions of the wide scope of the new institutional 
economics, see JOHN N. DROBAK & JOHN V.C. NYE, THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS xv–xx (1997); Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional Economics: 
Its Start, its Meaning, its Prospects, 6 EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161 (2005). Two excellent 
sources for the concepts and scholarship in NIE are ERIC FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS (1997), and THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS (Claude Ménard ed.) (2005). The variety in research topics and methodology 
stems, in part, from the wide range of academic disciplines attracted to NIE.  Scholars in the 
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With this focus on law, it is not surprising that there is 
considerable overlap in the scholarship by the new institutionalists 
and by scholars in law and economics. A number of shared attributes 
make the two disciplines very similar. Decades ago economics was 
easily divided into different schools, each with their own approach, 
so, for example, Harvard School economists were very different from 
Chicago School economists. In contrast today, the divide is between 
theoretical (sophisticated mathematical) economics and applied 
economics.15 Both NIE and law and economics are forms of applied 
economics. They also share a common heritage in the work of Ronald 
Coase. Much of modern law and economics is built on Coase’s ideas, 
just as is much of the new institutional scholarship.16 In comparing 
the two movements, Richard Posner has emphasized the similar 
topics that interest scholars in both fields, such as contracts, corporate 
governance, vertical integration, transaction costs, and property 
rights, and the common analytical techniques, such as case studies, 
historical analysis, and informal theories.17 Posner views NIE and law 
and economics as so similar that he concludes they are “two sides of 
the same coin.”18 Although Posner’s overall assessment of the 
similarities of the two disciplines is accurate, there are relevant 
differences.  
The two movements have different objectives: scholars in law and 
economics study the legal system while the new institutionalists 
study the economy. Of course, in studying the legal system some law 
and economic scholars examine the economic consequences of 
various legal rules, which is identical to what some new 
institutionalists do.19 However, the different objectives of the two 
disciplines affect the topics scholars find important enough to 
                                                     
field come from not only economics, but also political science, business, sociology, 
anthropology, and, of course, law. 
 15. POSNER, supra note 8, at 437.  
 16. As Richard Posner has written, Coase “can be said to stand at the intersection of these 
two movements making it natural to suppose that there is considerable overlap between them. 
. . .” Id. at 426. 
 17. Id. at 430, 439. 
 18. Id. at 440. 
 19. For example, while many new institutionalists would view transaction cost economics 
as a subdiscipline of NIE, the same can be said for law and economics. “Many of the law’s 
doctrines, procedures, and institutions can usefully be viewed as responses to the problem of 
transactions costs, being designed either to reduce those costs or, if they are incorrigibly 
prohibitive, to bring about the allocation of resources that would exist if they were zero. The 
law tries to make the market work and, failing that, tries to mimic the market.” POSNER, supra 
note 8, at 416. 
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research and the approaches they take in analyzing the topics.20 The 
Articles in this symposium illustrate the range of legal issues that 
interest NIE scholars. There are also topics that interest the new 
institutional economists but not most law and economics scholars, 
such as economic development, the theory of the state, and hybrid 
organizations.21 In addition, there are sometimes differences in the 
analytical techniques used in the two disciplines. Price theory, for 
example, is a tool much more frequently used in the economic 
analysis of the law than in NIE.22  
Part of the differences between the two movements stems from 
their origins in different academic fields. Modern law and economics 
is a product of American law schools. Economists have always been 
important to the economic analysis of law, but it was law professors 
who made law and economics an established part of the law 
curriculum and legal scholarship in the United States.23 In contrast, 
NIE is mostly a product of economists. With the focus on institutions, 
it was to be expected that some new institutionalists would 
concentrate on the law. The impetus for economists to study the law 
was even greater in Europe, where the tradition among law faculty 
discouraged the use of economics (and other social services, for that 
matter) for legal analysis.24 Thus, European economists filled the role 
that law professors played in America. Most of these European 
economists who analyzed the law were part of the new institutional 
economics. Even today, many new institutionalists would view law 
and economics as a subspecialty within NIE. With legal scholars 
studying the law in the law and economics movement and economists 
doing the same in NIE, it would be expected that the two disciplines 
would begin by focusing on different problems with different 
perspectives. However, scholars do not work in isolation. Each 
                                                     
 20. As Posner explains, the difference between the two approaches is “not in theory but in 
theoretical emphasis.” Id. at 439. 
 21. See Claude Ménard, Challenges in New Institutional Economics, in INSTITUTIONS IN 
PERSPECTIVE 21, 23–24 (Ulrich Bindseil, Justus Haucap and Christian Wey eds., 2006) (theory 
of hybrid arrangements). 
 22. POSNER, supra note 8, at 439. 
 23. See POSNER, note 8, at 437–39. 
 24. See Gerrit De Geest, European Association of Law and Economics, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY 509 (David S. Clark ed., 2007) (“law and economics met 
more resistance from traditional legal scholars in Europe”). Benito Arruñada and Veneta 
Andonova in their Article in this symposium, Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-Market 
Adaptations, note that law and economics was an American academic discipline. Infra at 81. 
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movement has influenced the other over the years, bringing the two 
closer and closer together. 
The differences between the new institutional economics and law 
and economics were much greater at their inception than they are 
today. In the first Article in this symposium, “The Role of Law in the 
New Institutional Economics,” Rudolf Richter compares the different 
approaches to contract issues in the two movements that existed thirty 
years ago. At that time, law and economics theory assumed perfect 
law enforcement with a world of only two states: With low 
transaction costs, parties could write complete contracts that would 
be enforced by courts. If the transaction costs of reaching agreement 
on all contractual terms were prohibitively high, the court would fill 
in the gaps. There was no intermediate position. In contrast to this 
analysis, transaction cost economists, following the lead of Oliver 
Williamson, assumed that legal enforcement was impeded or 
impossible. This assumption led them to concentrate on the 
contracting parties’ actions and on the way they could protect their 
interests short of litigation. In situations in which transaction costs 
were high, they were more concerned with the ways the parties could 
plan for private dispute resolution through hierarchical governance 
structures or hybrid forms of organization. Richter ends his paper by 
showing how the research of law and economic scholars has evolved 
to deal with the concerns of transaction costs economists, by studying 
such issues as contract renegotiation under duress and contract design 
that anticipates renegotiations in specific circumstances. This leads 
him to conclude that NIE and law and economics have converged to a 
similar approach on contract law issues. 
Frank Stephan and Stefan Van Hemmen give their perspective on 
the relationship between the new institutional economics and law and 
economics in the second Article in the symposium, “Laws, 
Enforcement, Legality, and Economic Development.” They 
emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the law on the 
books and the law as enforced, a distinction undervalued in early law 
and economic scholarship. They also rely on a model developed by 
Oliver Williamson to show how law fits into the wide range of issues 
included with NIE. Finally, they survey the various economic studies 
that connect economic growth to the legal environment, including 
well-known models crested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishy (LLSV models) and the World Bank’s “Doing Business” 
Project. 
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The third Article, “Can We Rank Legal Systems According to 
Their Economic Efficiency?” by Claude Ménard and Bertrand du 
Marais, is critical of these Rule of Law studies. After explaining the 
LLSV studies and the Doing Business project, the authors show the 
deficiencies in the methodologies and hence the conclusions that can 
be drawn from the studies. They end by applauding the attempts to 
understand the linkage between legal systems and economic growth, 
but they caution that this type of research, which needs more 
conceptual refinement and better methodologies, has “a long way to 
go in order to find the right direction.” 
Benito Arruñada and Veneta Andonova are just as critical of the 
LLSV studies and the Doing Business project in their Article 
“Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-Market Adaptations.” They 
point out that legal systems are imbedded in a complex network of 
political structures and social preferences and therefore cannot be 
studied in isolation. This holistic approach influences the authors’ 
reexamination of the claim that common law legal systems are 
superior to civil law regimes for purposes of economic performance. 
They point out that both systems were instrumental in protecting 
freedom of contract and in developing market economies. The 
judicial systems were different because they each adapted to different 
environments and circumstances. Arruñada and Andonova 
hypothesize that common law judges, for a number of reasons, were 
supportive of the development of a modern market system and so 
were allowed greater discretion than civil law judges, who were 
constrained legislatively out of a belief that they were anti-market. In 
finding cognitive differences between common and civil law judges, 
the authors rely on studies from cognitive science and behavioral 
economics. 
In the next Article in the symposium, “Understanding Judicial 
Decision-Making: The Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational 
Deliberations,” Douglass C. North and I also use cognitive science to 
examine how judges make decisions. We point out that the Legal 
Realists were correct in their claim that a judge’s opinion provides 
only a partial explanation of the reasons for a judicial decision. 
Although we know that judges’ belief systems, intuitions, and other 
hidden factors affect their decisions, cognitive science is still too 
primitive to help us understand how these non-doctrinal factors 
operate. We end by emphasizing the constraints built into both 
common and civil law legal systems that greatly limit the influence of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/2
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non-doctrinal factors on judicial decisions, just as constraints in the 
rest of the world often channel human decision-making to make it 
appear to be rational action. 
The next Article in the symposium, “Argentina’s Abandonment of 
the Rule of Law and Its Aftermath,” by Andrés Gallo and Lee Alston, 
is an example of NIE scholarship from the economic history 
tradition. The authors show how the impeachment of Supreme Court 
justices for political reasons shortly after Peron assumed the 
Presidency in 1946 began a cycle of continuous change in the 
judiciary that lasted throughout the twentieth century. Beginning with 
the Peron government, the Supreme Court lost legitimacy as an 
independent body and became too weak and too politicized to 
provide any check to the Executive branch. Gallo and Alston also 
show that judicial instability has been closely related to political 
instability, which in turn created an uncertain environment for 
investment in Argentina. 
The next two Articles in this symposium are examples of the NIE 
research that focuses on property rights. In “Law and the New 
Institutional Economics: Water Markets and Legal Change in 
California, 1987–2005,” the five authors (Jedidiah Brewer, Michael 
Fleishman, Robert Glennon, Alan Ker, and Gary Libecap) examine 
the interaction among regulation, property rights, and water markets 
in California. With the growing public pressure to reallocate fresh 
water from historical uses in agriculture to meet greater demands for 
use in urban areas, recreation, and environmental needs, the authors 
emphasize the importance of water markets for the voluntary 
exchange of water rights through leases of water and the sale of water 
rights. By studying the existing water markets in California over a 
20-year period in the context of changing laws and property rights, 
the authors have identified crucial factors important to successful 
water markets. 
In “On the importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in 
Finance and Innovation,” Stephen Haber, F. Scott Kieff, and Troy 
Paredes also investigate the relationships among property rights, 
regulation and economic performance. Their goal is to identify when 
property rights are “at their best” and most useful economically. To 
do this, the authors investigate property rights and regulation in 
various contexts, including the banking industry, the intellectual 
property system in biotechnology, the venture capital business, post-
Enron securities regulatory changes, and patent law reform. The 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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authors conclude by emphasizing the need to understand how both 
market and government actors will react in the face of various 
possible legal regimes and to develop policies flexible enough to 
adjust to the inevitable unexpected consequences of regulatory 
change. 
The last three Articles in the symposium examine different aspects 
of the legal regime in China as it is changing to accommodate rapid 
economic growth and to attract foreign investment. These papers are 
typical examples of NIE research about law and economic growth in 
developing countries. Sonja Opper and Sylvia Schwaag-Serger, in 
“Institutional Analysis of Legal Change: The Case of Corporate 
Governance in China,” examine the legal reforms in China’s formal 
corporate governance system and note that they fail in many ways to 
accomplish the goal of protecting shareholders. This leads the authors 
to conclude that informal norms and enforcement characteristics of a 
society are just as important as formal law to effecting legal change. 
Given the little research that exists on how formal rules and informal 
norms combine to shape the performance of organizations and 
economies, Opper and Schwaag-Serger suggest that transition 
economies provide opportunities for the useful study of this 
interrelationship. 
David Gerber’s Article, “Economics, Law & Institutions: The 
Shaping of Chinese Competition Law,” examines the factors that are 
influencing the content of a competition (antitrust) law being 
promulgated in China and that will influence implementation of the 
law. Gerber groups the factors into three sets: the domestic incentive 
structure, the cognitive limitations in the knowledge of foreign laws 
and their enforcement, and the foreign pressures intended to push 
China into certain actions. The author suggests that this approach will 
aid the analysis of any situation in which a local law is or may be 
influenced by foreign legal developments, especially in the context of 
globalization. Consequently, even though Gerber’s essay is an 
examination of legal developments in China, it establishes a 
methodology that has much broader application. 
Chenglin Liu anchors the symposium with his Article “The 
Chinese Takings Law from a Comparative Perspective,” in which he 
investigates the tension between private property rights and public 
development goals. Liu traces the history of urban home ownership 
in China since 1949 and then describes the massive demolitions that 
began in the 1990s to facilitate urban economic development. After 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/2
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comparing the Chinese eminent domain law with similar laws in the 
United States and Singapore, the author returns to a conclusion 
reached by earlier authors in this symposium: what matters is not the 
written law, but the law as enforced by the government. With the 
current Chinese government embracing a new ideology of 
“GDPism,” economic growth takes precedence over the rights of 
property owners.  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
